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Abstract: The study provides an incisive but preliminary investigation into the activities of the monetary policy 
committee of the central bank of Nigeria and the implications for monetary policy, using the standard deviation 
measure of volatility and the ordinary least square method. The findings show that the ‘internal’ members and 
majority of the ‘external’ members have different preferences as shown in the voting patterns. Also, there has 
been reduction in inflation, money and stock markets volatilities since the operations of the committee became 
more visible. Furthermore, there is no structural break in both the money and stock markets in the period when 
the central bank started releasing the personal statements and voting pattern of the committee members. The 
policy implication of these results is that the transparency with which the monetary policy committee has 
operated since 2011 has boosted policy credibility due to the reduction in markets volatility. Nevertheless, there 
is need for the individual committee members to be more visible to the public through different platforms as this 
will further improve the central bank’s communications strategy.    
Keywords: Monetary policy committee decisions, voting, volatility 
 
1. Introduction 
The role played by committees of central banks globally is becoming more and more a subject of discussion 
among policy and academic researchers. This is in line with the new thinking that committees may make better 
monetary policy decisions than individuals and that this has been seen as a major evolution in contemporary 
central banking.1 To this end, interest has surged in areas such as the size and composition of this committee, the 
background and ideological leaning of the members, effectiveness of the committee in terms of how the 
decisions reduce markets volatility, etc. In the Bank of England (BOE) and the European Central Bank (ECB), 
the committee responsible for taking monetary decisions is the monetary policy committee (MPC), while for the 
Federal Reserve Bank it is the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).  The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
also named its own committee the monetary policy committee as in the case of the BOE and the ECB. One of the 
main benefits of the committee on monetary policy is that it has enhanced the communications of central banks 
and therefore boosted monetary policy effectiveness. This is because the public, through the communications of 
the committee members, is able to gauge the likely direction of monetary policy and this will to some extent 
reduce volatility in the markets.  
 
The objective of this paper is therefore to provide an overview of the MPC of the CBN with a view to 
ascertaining the following: (1) if inflation volatility has reduced as a result of the composition of the committee 
(2) if money and stock markets volatility have reduced since the committee came to being (3) if the relationship 
between official interest rate, inflation, money and stock markets are weaker or stronger with the advent of the 
MPC (4) if there was a structural break in monetary policy since the activities of the committee became public.  
  
The literature on policy committee is summarized in section 2, while section 3 provides stylized facts on the 
MPC of the CBN and the voting patterns. Section 4 discusses the methodology for the empirical analysis while 
section 5 presents the results. Section 6 provides the policy implications of the findings.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on the role played by the MPC is at its infancy just like the broader literature on central bank 
communications. This section however attempts to provide some of the theoretical and empirical studies on the 
role of the MPC in the monetary policy process.    
                                                 
1
 Vandenbussche (2006) 
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The theoretical work by Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006) considered interval censored responses of individual 
committee members for the Bank of England in the context of a model in which inflation forecast targeting is 
used, with both heterogeneity and interaction among the members of the committee. The study found substantial 
heterogeneity in the policy reaction function across members as well as significant interactions between 
individual decisions of the committee members. Using an analytical framework which shows how different 
arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members, Berk and Bierut (2009) 
demonstrate how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members. The 
results illustrate that when members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions 
should not be based on pre-prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as 
a majority of views expressed by the members. Weber (2010) developed a theoretical model of a MPC with 
heterogeneous members whose decisions and public communications are observed by the financial markets. The 
results show that transparency about the different views among committee members surrounding the economic 
outlook is beneficial. However, the study also noted that communicating the diversity of views about the 
monetary policy decision may not be welfare enhancing, at least in the short term.  
 
With respect to the optimal size of the committee, Erhart and Vasquez-Paz (2007) developed a conceptual model 
in order to analyze the issue in case of monetary policy formulation. The study posits that the optimal MPC size 
varies according to the uncertainty of members’ information influenced by the size of the monetary zone and 
overall economic stability. Their conceptual model was backed up with econometric evidence where they found 
that of the 85 countries surveyed, the MPC size of large monetary zones (EMU, USA, Japan) is close to the 
estimated optimal level, but there exist several smaller countries with too many or too few MPC members. 
Similarly, Maurin and Vidal (2012) asked how large should the committee be and which voting rule should be 
adopted? The study proceeds to analyzing the relationships between the committees’ size and voting rules in a 
model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. Their results suggest that in large committees’ 
majority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes while under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit 
the size of the committee. The study concludes that supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that 
contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial policy proposals are less likely to 
be correct, or when payoffs are asymmetric. Hansen et al. (2012) used voting data from the Bank of England and 
showed that different individual assessments of the economy strongly influence votes after controlling for 
individual policy preferences. The study therefore estimated that internal members form more precise 
assessments than external members and are also more hawkish, though preference differences are very small if 
members vote strategically. They also showed that committees add value through aggregating private 
assessments, but those gains to larger committees taper off quickly beyond five members. They concluded that 
there is no evidence that external members add value through preference moderation. Therefore, since the 
assessments of external members have lower precision the study concluded that mixed committees may not be 
optimal. Chappell et al. (2013) developed an econometric model to describe intra-committee power-sharing 
across members for the Bank of England and Sweden’s Riksbank, the results of the study show that for the Bank 
of England the Governor has little influence over other committee members, while those for the Riksbank 
indicate that the Governor is highly influential. 
 
With respect to the link with inflation, Erhart et al. (2007) conducted an empirical cross-country study to explore 
whether there is a link between the size of MPC and inflation volatility. The results show that countries with less 
than five MPC members tend to have larger deviations from trend inflation than MPCs with five members; 
raising the number of MPC members above five does not contribute to a further reduction in volatility. Farvaque 
et al. (2012) examined the influence of the biographical experience of MPC members on their performance in 
managing inflation and output volatilities. Using a sample of major OECD countries in the 1999 to 2010 period, 
they found that a higher number of governors are more effective, except in crisis time. Also, they show that 
policymakers' background influence the performance, with a positive role for committee members from the 
academia, the central bank and the financial sector.  
 
Kiss (2012) studied preference heterogeneity in monetary policy committees of inflation-targeting (IT) countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) during the period 2005−2010. The study employed (individual) voting 
records of the Monetary Council of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary) and of the 
Monetary Policy Council of the National Bank of Poland. Preference heterogeneity in committees is not directly 
observable. Therefore, they pursue an indirect measurement and conduct an econometric analysis based on 
(pooled) Taylor-type reaction functions estimated using real-time information on economic and financial 
indicators and voting records. The study finds preference heterogeneity to be random for both the members of 
the Monetary Policy Council of the National Bank of Poland (NBP), and the members of the Monetary Council 
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB). However, the diversity of views on the inflation forecast is measurable in 
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both committees. A separate cluster analysis shows that different preferences of MPC members may be 
attributable to their status (chairman, internal member, external member) and that members may also differ in 
their desired response to changes in the economic outlook.  
 
Following from the review of the literature, the next section provides some stylized facts about the committee in 
the central bank of Nigeria, with a view to providing the basis for descriptively and empirically investigating the 
role of the committee in the monetary policy process in Nigeria.  
 
3. Stylized Facts on the Monetary Policy Committee of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
The move towards greater transparency and credibility of monetary policy in Nigeria may have commenced in 
2004 when the CBN started releasing its monetary policy communiqué. However, it was not until the 
promulgation of the CBN Act of 2007 that the apex bank became completely autonomous of the Ministry of 
Finance. Consequently, the CBN has been more independence in the use of its policy instruments in the conduct 
of monetary policy.   
However, despite the release of monetary policy communiqués since 2004, monetary policy transparency 
remained an issue as the composition of the decision makers’ was not known to the public. Therefore, the setting 
up of the MPC in line with the provisions of the CBN Act 2007 has led to an improvement in monetary policy 
process. Table 1 shows the composition of the committee as at May 2013, comprising two members from the 
CBN Board, two nominated by the CBN governor and three by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
The five members, that is, the three appointed by the President and the two by the CBN governor, are herein 
referred to as ‘external members’. The remaining seven members are ‘internal members’ since they are either 
fully affiliated with the CBN or are Board members.  
Table 1: Monetary Policy Committee Members as at May 2013 
 Status Affiliation Basis for membership 
Sanusi L. Sanusi  Governor and Chairman  CBN CBN Act 2007 
Tunde Lemo  Dep. Governor and 
Member 
CBN CBN Act 2007 
Sarah Alade Dep. Governor and 
Member 
CBN CBN Act 2007 
Suleiman Barau Dep. Governor and 
Member 
CBN CBN Act 2007 
Kingsley Moghalu  Dep. Governor and 
Member 
CBN CBN Act 2007 
Sam O. Olofin** Board Member University of Ibadan CBN Act 2007 
Danladi Kifasi  Board Member Ministry of Finance CBN Act 2007 
Adedoyin R. Salami  Member Lagos Business School Appointed by CBN 
Governor 
John Oshilaja Member Consultant Appointed by CBN 
Governor 
Abdul-Ganiyu Garba  Member Ahmadu Bello 
University 
Appointed by President 
Shehu Yahaya  Member AfDB Appointed by President 
Chibuike U. Uche  Member University of Nigeria Appointed by President 
Source: Compiled from CBN website as at 31 May 2013 
**Last meeting as MPC member was in March 2013 
Since activities of the committee became obvious to the public, monetary policy operations are now fairly 
gauged as the committee meets six times in a year and there is a time-table for such meetings, meaning that the 
public is able to follow and monitor the proceedings. In addition, there are instances when special meetings are 
called such as the one held on 18 September 2008 due to the effects of the global financial crisis on the domestic 
economy.  
In 2011, the MPC took a significant step in line with global best practices when it started releasing members’ 
personal statements and voting patterns alongside the communiqués.1  This further brought greater awareness 
                                                 
1
 There are, however, a few instances where the personal statements and voting patterns are not released as was the case in 
July 2011.  
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with respect to monetary policy operations in Nigeria. In other words, this step by the central bank has improved 
its communication with the public as analysts are able to read and study the sentiments of the committee 
members as well as monitor their voting patterns. The implication of this is that based on developments in the 
economy as well as knowing the ideological leaning of the committee members, the public may have an idea of 
the likely interest rate decision of the committee at any point in time.   
Figure 1 shows that monetary policy has taken a more neutral stance since 2011 when the MPC started releasing 
members’ statements and voting patterns. It is therefore important to illustrate how the different members have 
voted in line with some of the studies in the literature. The importance of this is that the voting pattern of the 
committee members provides the public with the ideological leaning of the MPC members and therefore help 
gauge the likely direction of future monetary policy decisions.  
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Figure 1: Breakdown of Monetary Policy Decisions since 2011 
                              Source: Compiled from CBN monetary policy communiqués 
 
Figure 2 explains that in 2011, the voting pattern of all the ‘internal’ members was similar as they all voted six 
times to increase the monetary policy rate (MPR) and voted once to leave it unchanged. The voting pattern of the 
‘external’ members, however, appears different given that Dr. Adedoyin Salami and John Oshilaja’s voting 
aligns with those of the ‘internal’ members.  However, Professor Abdul-Ganiyu, Chibuike Uche and Shehu 
Yahaya, through their voting appear to have favored a neutral rather than a contractionary stance.   
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Figure 2: Monetary Policy Committee Voting Pattern in 2011 
      
                               Source: Compiled from CBN monetary policy communiqués 
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Figure 3 again depicts that in 2012, the voting pattern was similar across the board for all the ‘internal’ members 
who all voted six times to maintain the MPR. Of the ‘external’ members, both Dr. Adedoyin Salami and John 
Oshilaja voted similar to the ‘internal’ members. However, Professor Abdul Ganiyu Garba voted to maintain the 
rate five times while Shehu Yahaya voted thrice to leave the official rate unchanged.  
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Figure 3: Monetary Policy Committee Voting Pattern in 2012 
                                  Source: Compiled from CBN monetary policy communiqués 
The voting pattern in the first three meetings held in 2013, depicted in Figure 4, indicates that the voting pattern 
of the ‘internal’ members remained similar as they all voted to hold interest rate constant. One of the ‘external’ 
members Dr. Adedoyin Salami voted similar to the ‘internal’ members to keep the MPR unchanged. On the 
contrary, two external members, Professor Abdul Ganiyu Garba and Chibuike Uche voted three times in favor of 
interest rate cut while Danladi Kifasi and Shehu Yahaya voted to cut interest rate once.  
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Figure 4: Monetary Policy Committee Voting Pattern in 2013 
                               Source: Compiled from CBN monetary policy communiqués 
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The implications of the voting pattern of the MPC members are that the ‘internal’ members have similar voting 
pattern while the majority of external members appear to lend dissenting voices. Specifically, while the internal 
members show more preference for price and exchange rate stability, the majority of the external members are 
more inclined towards the secondary mandate of the central bank which is to support economic growth. The 
voting pattern of the ‘external’ members is usually mixed with one or two of them always aligning with the 
‘internal members’ while the majority of them usually vote contrariwise. The observed voting pattern of the 
monetary policy committee of the CBN is in line with the findings of Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) whose 
results show that the Bank of England’s MPC exhibits a remarkably high degree of dispersion in voting since 
external members seem to provide statements indicating tightening or easing of policy relatively more often than 
internal members.    
4. Methodology  
 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis    
We first attempt to ascertain if the move towards improved communications by the central bank by way of 
making the activities of the monetary policy committee more visible has affected markets volatility. The 
volatility measure applied here is the standard deviation. Following from the volatility measure, we use the 
correlation technique to find out the manner of association between the official interest rate and other rates, 
particularly since the activities of the monetary policy committee became pronounced.  
4.2 Empirical Estimation 
The ordinary least square (OLS) estimation technique is applied in to the study. The first OLS estimation aims to 
ascertain how the official interest rate and communications have affected the money market rate (NIBOR). The 
linear relationship is stated as follows:  
                               NIBOR = f (MRRMPR, COMM, TIME)                                                (1) 
Where NIBOR is Nigerian Interbank Offer Rate, MRRMPR is the official interest rate, COMM is 
communications and TIME captures the time variable included in the equation. Communications is captured 
using a dummy and will provide an indication of the impact of the monetary policy committee on the money 
market. The estimation will use the Chow test to find out if structural breaks exist under the different 
communication regimes.                                            
Theoretically, precisely through the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the money market rate proxied by 
the NIBOR is expected to mirror the official interest rate (MRRMPR). This is because the central bank in 
attempting to push through its policy goal sees the banking sector as a key transmission channel. Therefore, an 
expansionary policy stance is expected to affect the NIBOR rate, thereby increasing liquidity in the system, and 
vice-versa. Also, the way the central bank communicates its policy decisions is very important as money market 
players, if they truly understand what the central bank is doing, may have already factored in the expected policy 
decision in their transactions, thereby reducing market rate volatility. The essence of the time variable is because 
the economy is not static hence the need to capture its changing dynamics.  
The second OLS estimation is to ascertain how the official interest rate and communications as captured by the 
role of the monetary policy committee have affected the stock market All Share Index (ASI). Again, the Chow 
test will be used to ascertain if structural breaks exists in the period that the policy committee started making its 
activities public. The relationship is stated as follows:  
                                           ASI = f (MRRMPR, COMM, TIME)                                             (2) 
The stock market rate is expected to respond negatively to interest rate decision due to the fact that the market is 
an alternative platform for investment. For example, an expansionary policy stance is expected to increased 
liquidity which will depress money market rates, making investors seek alternative investment outlets. Also, the 
improved liquidity position means that there is enough money in the system and the stock market is expected to 
benefit from such liquidity increase.  
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Therefore, the a priori expectation is a negative relationship between the stock market and the official interest 
rate.  Also, the way the central bank communicates its policy decisions through the monetary policy committee is 
very important to both value and short-term investors in the stock market. For example, if the market is able to 
gauge monetary policy sentiment fully through the way and manner the central bank is communicating, then 
investors will factor in the expected policy decision in their investments decision.    
4.3 Data Source and Time Frame  
Quarterly data from 1985q1 to 2013q2 sourced primarily from the Central Bank of Nigeria is used. The analysis 
is grouped on the basis of three periods namely 1985q1 to 2004q3, 2004q3 to 2010q4 and 2011q1 to 2013q2. 
The period 1985q1 to 2004q3 is when the CBN was not releasing the monetary policy communiqué and the 
composition of the policy committee was not known by the public. The period 2004q4 to 2010q4 was when the 
policy communiqués were released while the period 2011q1 to 2013q2  is when the central bank started releasing 
the personal statements and voting patterns of the committee members.   
5. Discussion of Results  
5.1 Measures of Volatility 
Figure 5 shows that the volatility in the inflation rate was considerably high in the period 1985q1 to 2004q2 with 
a standard deviation of 23.764. However, between 2004q4 and 2010q4 when the central bank started releasing 
the policy communiqués, inflation volatility dropped significantly with the standard deviation being only 4.777. 
The volatility reduced further between 2011q1 to 2013q2 when the central bank started publishing the personal 
statements and voting patterns of the MPC members. The implication of this is that improved monetary policy 
transparency through activities of the MPC has led to better communications and consequently reduced inflation 
volatility.  
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Figure 5: Inflation Rate Volatility    
          
                                                           Source: Authors’ estimates 
Figure 6 shows that money market volatility was highest between 1985q1 and 2004q3, the period when interest 
rate decisions were not clearly communicated to the public. Between 2004q4 and 2010q4 when policy 
communiqués were released, volatility reduced significantly, while the reduction continued between 2011q1 to 
2013q2 when the members’ personal statements and voting patterns of committee members were released 
alongside the policy communiqués.   
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Figure 6: Volatility of the NIBOR Rate 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
The stock market volatility is also examined in the different periods. Figure 7 shows that the volatility of the 
market has reduced significantly since 2011q1 when the CBN started publishing the personal statements and 
voting patterns of the MPC members. However, between 2004q4 and 2010q4 when only the communiqué of the 
meetings were released, the volatility of the market was even higher than the period when the CBN was not 
releasing policy communiqués. The relatively high volatility in this period may be attributed to the effect of the 
different reforms in the financial sector which led to high speculative activities. Specifically, the banking 
consolidation reform saw all the banks going to the stock market to raise funds in order to meet the new capital 
requirement. As a result, margin loans by banks increased while stock brokers and other market participants 
engaged in short-term trading rather than the long-term horizon that the market was supposed to serve.   
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Figure 7: Volatility of the All Share Index 
                                                        Source: Authors’ estimates 
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5.2 Measures of Relationship among the Variables  
Following from the volatility measure of inflation rate, the money market rate and the stock market all share 
index, this sub-section attempts to corroborate that discussion with the analysis on the relationship between the 
official interest rate and the NIBOR rate as well as between the official interest rate and ASI and inflation in the 
different periods.   
As shown in Figure 8, between 1985q1 and 2004q3 when central bank communications was still unclear, the 
then anchor rate, the Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) had a strong relationship with the NIBOR with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.78. During the period 2004q4 to 2010q4 when the policy communiqués were being 
released, the relationship between the MRR and NIBOR was weak with coefficient of 0.39. This weak 
relationship may be attributed to the instability in the banking sector which the various reforms that were 
implemented in the period were meant to correct. However, one of the unintended consequences of the reforms 
turned out to be a weak relationship between the official interest rate and the NIBOR rate. Part of the measures 
taken to correct this shortcoming was the dropping of the MRR on 5 December 2006 and replacing it with the 
Monetary Policy Rate (MPR). However, the overall relationship between the official anchor and the market rate 
in the period 2004q4 to 2010q4 remained weak in the period despite the move towards improved 
communications by the CBN.  
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Figure 8: Correlation between MRR/MPR, NIBOR, ASI and Inflation 
                     Source: Authors’ estimates 
  
 
However, in the period 2011q1 to 2013q1 when the CBN stepped up its communications strategy by releasing as 
part of the policy communiqués, the personal statements and voting pattern of the MPC members, the 
relationship between the MPR and the NIBOR became more robust with a correlation coefficient of 0.91. 
 
 
With respect to the relationship between the official interest rate and the stock market, Figure 8 also shows that 
between 1985q1 and 2004q3 when policy communiqués were not made public, the correlation coefficient 
between the MRR and the ASI is 0.24. The implication of this positive but weak relationship is that the stock 
market was not providing the platform as alternative vehicle of investment as theory posits a negative association 
between interest rate and equity investments. However, between 2004q4 and 2010q4 when policy communiqués 
were released, the market became responsive to interest rates decisions as the correlation coefficient became 
negative, albeit, weak. This implies a gradual sophistication of the market as investors saw the market as an 
alternative investment platform in the event of an interest rate change by the central bank. Since 2011q1 when 
the personal statements and voting patterns of MPC members are released, there has been a stronger negative 
relationship between the MPR and the ASI.  
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The periods 1985q1 to 2004q3 as well as 2004q4 to 2010q4 saw a positive but weak relationship between the 
official interest rate and inflation rate. However, the relationship since 2011q1 when the public can properly 
gauge monetary policy sentiment because of the understanding provided by the releasing of the personal 
statements and voting patterns of the MPC members’ a strong negative relationship exists between the MPR and 
the inflation rate. The implication of this is that the MPR has been relatively effective as the monetary policy 
anchor.   
5.3 Empirical Results 
5.3.1 Unit Root Test   
To ascertain the time series properties of the variables, Figure 9 shows that the MRRMPR, NIBOR and ASI have 
unit roots and became stationary after first differencing as shown in Figure 10. Therefore, the empirical analysis 
is conducted using the variables after first difference. Also, the variables were transformed into their natural 
logarithms.  
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Figure 9: Charts of Selected Variables at Level 
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Figure 10: Charts of Selected Variables at First Difference  
5.3.2 OLS Estimations   
The first OLS estimation is to ascertain how the official interest rate and improved communications through 
activities of the MPC have affected the money market in the period 1985q1 to 2013q2. Table 2 shows the results 
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of estimation with the official interest rate having significant positive impact on the NIBOR, while 
communications is insignificant even though it has the right sign. The explanatory variables are only able to 
explain 26% of the variations in the NIBOR rate.  
Table 2: Model 1: OLS, using observations 1985:2-2013:1 (T = 112) 
Dependent variable: NIBOR 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Const 0.0152 0.0232 0.6554 0.5136 
MRRMPR 0.6017 0.1081 5.5683 0.0000 
COMM 0.0531 0.0466 1.1382 0.2576 
Time -0.0004 0.0004 -0.9433 0.3476 
     
R-square 0.2639 
   
Adj. R-square 0.2435 
   
Durbin-Watson 1.3302 
   
   Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the diagnostic tests. Although the model failed the normality test, other results 
indicate that there is no presence of heteroskedasticity while the specification test shows that the model is 
adequately specified. The test for structural break indicates that in the period 2004q4 when the central bank 
started releasing its monetary policy communiqué, we fail to accept the null hypothesis of no structural break. In 
other words, the results show that there is a structural break in the period. On the contrary however, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no structural break from the period 2011q1 when the central bank started releasing 
the personal statements and voting pattern of the MPC members.    
 
Table 3: Results of the Post-estimation Tests for Model 1 
 
Tests Null hypotheses P-value 
Normality Error is normally distributed 0.0002 
Heteroskedasticity No presence of heteroskedasticity 0.8474 
Specification test  Specification is adequate  0.3373  
Test for structural break at 2004q3  No structural break  0.0079  
Test for structural break at 2011q1  No structural break  0.9226  
   Source: Authors’ estimations  
The results of the second OLS estimation as shown in Table 4 indicates that the explanatory variables are only 
able to explain less than 10% of the variation in the stock market all share index in the period 1985q1 to 2013q1. 
However, the official interest rate has significant negative impact on the all share index, meaning that investors 
in the period have been able to see the stock market as an alternative investment platform. The impact of 
communications is, however, insignificant even though it has the right sign. This is an indication of the weak 
transmission of monetary policy decisions through the asset channel.  
Table 4: Model 2: OLS, using observations 1985:2-2013:1 (T = 112) 
Dependent variable: ASI 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Const 0.1019 0.0215 4.7268 0.0000 
MRRMPR -0.1777 0.1003 -1.7709 0.0794 
COMM 0.0065 0.0433 0.1520 0.8794 
Time -0.0009 0.0003 -2.6583 0.0091 
     
R-square 0.0962 
   
Adj. R-square 0.0711 
   
Durbin-Watson 1.2033 
   
    Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the accompanying diagnostic tests.  Again, the model failed the normality test but 
other results indicate that there is no presence of heteroskedasticity while the RESET test for specification shows 
that the model is adequately specified. Tests for structural breaks show that we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
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of no structural break in 2004q3 when the when the central bank started its policy communiqué as well as in 
2011q1 when the apex bank started releasing the personal statements and voting pattern of the MPC members.    
 
Table 5: Results of the Post-estimation Tests for Model 2 
 
Tests Null hypotheses P-value 
Normality Error is normally distributed 0.0001 
Heteroskedasticity No presence of heteroskedasticity 0.1713  
Specification test  Specification is adequate  0.4535  
Test for structural break at 2004q3  No structural break  0.2172  
Test for structural break at 2011q1  No structural break  0.8313  
    Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
6. Summary of Findings and Policy Implications   
The study provided a preliminary investigation into the activities of the monetary policy committee of the central 
bank of Nigeria and how this has affected both inflation volatility and the money and stock markets. The main 
findings are as follows (i) the voting pattern of the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ members is usually different, albeit, 
with one or two ‘external members’ voting in a similar manner with the ‘internal members’ (ii) inflation 
volatility reduced significantly since operations of the committee became more public (iii) money and stock 
markets volatility have also reduced since the activities of the policy committee became public (iv) the 
relationship between the official interest rate and inflation on one hand and between the official interest rate and 
money and stock market on the other, has improved in the period of the committee’s operations (v) official 
interest rate has significant positive impact on the money market while communications has insignificant effect 
even though it has the right sign (vi) there is a structural break in the period 2004q4 when the central bank 
started releasing its policy communiqués (vii) there is no structural break in the period when the central bank 
started releasing the personal statements and voting pattern of the MPC members (viii) official interest rate has 
significant negative impact on the stock market all share index, while the impact of communications is 
insignificant even though it has the right sign (ix) there is no structural break when the apex bank started 
releasing the personal statements and voting pattern of the MPC members.    
These findings have a number of policy implications. First, monetary policy through the operations of the 
monetary policy committee has reduced markets volatilities which is good for macroeconomic stability. 
Therefore, there is need for the central bank, through the committee, to continue to pursue credible policy 
initiatives. Second, the fact that the relationship between the official interest rate and market indicators improved 
the most since the policy committee’s activities became more transparent is also an indication that the central 
bank through the committee should continue to improve on its communications with the public. Third, given that 
there is no structural break in the period that the policy committee’s activities have become pronounced means 
that the central bank must continually devise ways by which it will improve on the activities of the committee.   
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